Obi goes bankrupt | Council on Foreign Relations

At this time last year, Peter Obi was just one of several politicians seeking the presidential candidacy of the opposition People’s Democratic Party (PDP). Personally, he only hoped to go one step further than four years ago when he secured the same party’s nomination as Atiku Abubakar’s running mate. That all changed in the last week of May when, citing events within the party that made it “impossible to continue participating and making constructive contributions”, Obi unexpectedly resigned from the PDP.

Considering the information that has since come to light, Obi, in all likelihood, had come to the conclusion that he had almost no chance of reclaiming the PDP ticket after learning of the last-minute deal between Abubakar and the governor. from Sokoto state, Aminu Tambuwal, who decisively skewed the field in favor of the former. In any event, his defection from the PDP, followed by his acceptance of the Labor Party’s (LP) presidential candidacy, set off a chain of events that would drastically change the character and tenor of the entire 2023 presidential campaign.

While the news of Obi’s defection to Labor was initially met with a shrug, that indifference slowly transformed into sympathy, especially among a cross section of the public enraged not only by the harsh justice he received within the PDP, but also for the realization that Abubakar destroyed in one fell swoop an elite power-sharing pact and with it the possibility of the PDP nominating a southern candidate for the 2023 elections.

As interest in Obi’s candidacy grew, what began as a random circle of ardent supporters gradually became what most analysts consider to be the most significant and certainly the most energetic youth-led movement in Nigeria. in the last three decades: the “Obidient.” Primarily driven by their loyalty to Obi, but united more by their disgust at the country’s failed leadership, the Obi-dient is the great delta in which all the rivulets of grievances against the Nigerian state and political elite since independence have met. , most recently seen on display. during the #EndSARS protests of October 2020, they have spilled. One of the Obi’s many unwanted achievements is becoming a symbol of these storied longings and the pent-up frustrations of those who have sat upon them for so long.

If providing a receptacle for historical unrest will be Obi’s main achievement, it is by no means the only one. In the heart of the Igbo, he has made what seemed rather far-fetched last year, an Igbo presidency, a clear possibility. For the first time since the conclusion of the Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970), a cross-section of Igbos have a genuine belief that an Igbo politician has a decent chance of being elected to lead the country, an eventuality that will put an end to to decades of de facto ethnopolitical rustication. Infinitely more resourceful than his supporters admit, or his opponents are willing to concede, Obi has embraced this endorsement without succumbing to the impulse to ethnicize his campaign.

Outside the southeast region, Obi’s candidacy has instigated major political realignments. In the southwest, for example, the Yoruba socio-cultural group, Afenifere, is torn apart, with one group breaking with Obi on the principle that it is the turn of the Igbo to produce the country’s president. To the extent that Obi’s ethnic identity is important to his campaign, the candidate is not the one making the argument and, significantly, former President Olusegun Obasanjo’s endorsement of Obi omitted any reference to ethnicity, only insisting that Obi is the one with “an advantage” over the other contestants.

Where does all this leave Obi’s presidential bid? Will his undeniable status as a field marshal in the army of disgruntled Nigerians be enough to earn him the job he craves and in which, given his pedigree, he has an equal chance of succeeding? Will it matter that Obi is neither Tinubu nor Abubakar, even though, as Obasanjo mentioned in the aforementioned endorsement, “none of the contestants are saints”?

Obi’s supporters have rightly scoffed at the observation that their candidate has no basic game, having inherited a Labor Party that has, by and large, been a spectral presence in Nigerian politics for most of the Fourth. Republic. Yet few of those supporters can deny that to win Nigerian elections, local presence is crucial. Despite Obi’s popularity, the Labor Party remains an unknown quantity in most of the country, and its candidate’s acquired charisma has so far failed to translate into tangible gains for the party at state and local government levels.

The Obi-dient’s zeal to show up and seek support for his candidate will leave a mark on the election, though the amount of mark is a different matter. Although the sentiment on Nigerian politics that he adds is widely shared, the Obi-dient, for reasons of structural handicaps for which he cannot be held responsible, remains circumscribed at the regional, local and societal level. The question of whether online ardor translates to offline engagement (it does, to a degree) is one thing; The biggest challenge is that Nigeria’s use of social media, as a component of what African digital humanities scholar James Yékú describes as the “cultural internet,” appears skewed in favor of the South. While, given the disparities in literacy rates between the northern and southern regions, this is not surprising, it does raise questions about the compass and the penetration of the movement’s influence. Given these conditions, we might reasonably expect Obi to get the most votes in the southern urban areas, let alone outside the urban centers, with support dwindling considerably as the south shifts to the north.

Like Tinubu and Abubakar, Obi also has a house that he struggles to put in order. While his candidacy has gained ground among the Igbo rank and file (agitation for Igbo self-determination has noticeably muted as hopes of an obi victory have soared), an influential section of the Igbo elite remains dubious. Anambra State Governor Charles Soludo may not be alone in his continuing reservation that “anger and turmoil on social media” does not necessarily translate into the expected “political results”.

Perhaps Obi’s contribution to this election, and to the Nigerian political process in general, should not be judged by whether or not he wins the presidency, a goal that seems, by all indications, too far a bridge in this particular cycle. Goodwill, while undeniable, seems far superior to driving social forces. On the contrary, Obi is to be commended for having rekindled hope among young Nigerians regarding the country’s long-term prospects. With a new generation now duly incorporated, no election in Nigeria will be the same.

While moral victory isn’t the reason he’s in the race, it seems likely that’s what Peter Obi and his energetic supporters will have to settle for.